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I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans have little knowledge or concern about what hap-
pens inside this Nation's prisons.' Unless prisoners riot, they generally
are far removed from the popular consciousness. 2 Members of society
beyond prison walls hear about only the most severe and exceptional
cases of prisoner suffering.3 When prisoners do not receive adequate
1. See Robert Dvorchak, Medicine Behind Bars: Quality Care Is Elusive, Despite Lawsuits;
Hostile Public, Shortage of Good Doctors and Nurses Worsen Prison Problem, L.A. Times 2 (June
18, 1989).
2. Lois G. Forer, The Prisoner and the Psychiatrist, 31 Emory L. J. -61 (1982).
3. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan concurring).
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medical treatment, however, they may suffer harm beyond the segrega-
tion from society and loss of liberty contemplated by incarceration.4 A
discussion of the medical care that prisoners receive must begin, there-
fore, with a recognition of the paradox of taking care of individuals
about whom very few people in society care.5
The issue of the adequacy of prison health care is very important
today. The deprivation of adequate medical care frequently is a basis
for lawsuits filed by prisoners in the United States. Prison health care
delivery today fails to measure up to acceptable standards. 7 While com-
mentators agree that reform of health care delivery systems in this Na-
tion's prisons remains necessary," the problem of inadequate prison
health care is considerably more difficult to remedy than it is to ac-
knowledge. 9 The quality, quantity, accessibility, continuity, and effi-
ciency of prison medical services all draw criticism.10 Furthermore,
direct and unequivocal statements from courts and commentators con-
cerning prison health care are very rare.11 This vagueness produces in-
action and indecision that, combined with public apathy and the
political powerlessness of prisoners, has served only to exacerbate
problems in the delivery of prison health care.12
The text of the Constitution imposes no express duty to provide
medical care.' 3 In Estelle v. Gamble, however, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that state and federal governments have an obligation to
4. See Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that "[d]enial of
necessary medical attention may well result in disabilities beyond that contemplated by the incar-
ceration itself"). See also Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cir. 1974)
(stating that "[s]egregation from society and loss of one's liberty are the only punishment the law
allows").
5. Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1).
6. Id.
7. See, for example, Jim Doyle, Judge Holds SF in Contempt, San Fran. Chronicle A8 (Jan.
25, 1991); Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Advocates Urge Better Conditions For Women Inmates,
Christian Science Monitor 9 (May 29, 1991); Ann Bancroft, Testimony on Deaths in Vacaville
Jail, San Fran. Chronicle A14 (Aug. 20, 1991); Tom Coakley and Jack Sullivan, R.I. Inmates, Po-
lice in Fiery, 4'.,-hour Standoff, Boston Globe 19 (Oct. 1, 1991).
8. See, for example, Phil Gunby, Health Care Reforms Still Needed in the Nation's Pris-
ons, 245 JAMA 211 (1981).
9. Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1576 (D. Idaho 1984) (stating
that "pointing out constitutional deprivations is easier than fashioning a remedy"), rev'd in part,
869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. See generally, Office of Development, Testing, and Dissemination, National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and United
States Department of Justice, Health Care in Correctional Institutions - MANUAL 4 (1979)
("MANUAL").
11. B. Jaye Anno, Standards for Health Care in Correctional Institutions, MANUAL at 31
(cited in note 10).
12. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 358 (Brennan concurring).
13. See, for example, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
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provide health care to the individuals whom they incarcerate.14 The
Court held that the government's custody and control of prisoners de-
nies those prisoners the opportunity to care for themselves and, there-
fore, places on the government an obligation to care for them.1 5 Indeed,
Gamble makes the incarcerated the only Americans who enjoy a consti-
tutional guarantee of medical care at government expense.1 6
Prisoners do not forfeit all the traditional rights of citizenry upon
incarceration and, among other rights, retain access to the judicial sys-
tem. 1 7 In addition to traditional tort actions for mistreatment," inmates
may file actions in federal district court under the Civil Rights Act of
187119 alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment,20 applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2' Prisoners most fre-
14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (recognizing "the government's obligation to
provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be
met.") See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (stating that "a duty to provide
certain services and care does not exist"); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Ser-
vices, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (stating that "when the State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being"); Fitzke, 468 F.2d at 1076 (stat-
ing that "[a]n individual incarcerated, whether for a term of life for the commission of some hei-
nous crime, or merely for the night to 'dry out' in the local drunk tank, becomes both vulnerable
and dependent upon the state to provide certain simple and basic human needs"); Ramsey v.
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (stating that "there is a constitutional duty to
provide needed medical treatment to a prisoner").
15. See, for example, Ramsey, 310 F. Supp. at 604-05; Eric Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the
Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Care, 63 Va. L. Rev. 921, 938-
39 (1977).
16. See Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1).
17. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (stating that, "though his rights may
be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country"); Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266, 285 (1948); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
576 (8th Cir. 1968); Note, Inmates' Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
1475, 1481 (1986).
18. A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) is permissible regardless of the availabil-
ity of state remedies. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens concurring). For a
discussion of tort remedies available to prisoners, see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963);
James J. Gobert and Neil P. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners 63-64 (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1981); William P. Isele, Constitutional Issues of the Prisoner's Right to Health Care, MANUAL at
15 (cited in note 10). For a discussion of related issues of immunity, see Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721
F.2d 632, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1983); Gobert and Cohen, Rights of Prisoners at 64-66; Note, A Review
of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. Richmond L. Rev. 803, 900-22
(1977); Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment? 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 92, 116-19 (1977).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
20. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970).
21. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Jackson, 404 F.2d at 576.
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quently seek remedies for alleged violations of their constitutional
rights under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.22 In-
mates' frequent availment of this cause of action raises serious concerns
that malpractice will become a constitutional tort 3 or that doctors in
prisons will be encouraged to practice defensive medicine. 24
In Gamble the Supreme Court announced that inadequate health
care for prisoners does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless prison
authorities are deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.25 This
Note argues that the Gamble Court's choice of standard was inappro-
priate. In 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter, the Court extended the deliberate
indifference standard to apply to cruel and unusual punishment claims
regarding all conditions of incarceration. 26 The Wilson decision affirmed
and extended the already-inappropriate deliberate indifference medical
care standard, which, because of developing community standards, had
become even more inappropriate by 1991.
This Note explores the appropriateness of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard as it applies to claims that inadequate prison health care
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Part II examines the roots and relevant applications of the proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment. Part III focuses on the deliberate in-
difference standard of Gamble and Wilson and considers factors that
must play a role in the selection of an appropriate standard. Part IV
discusses the growth and application of the deliberate indifference stan-
dard. Part V examines aspects of imprisonment that affect health care
delivery and the determination of an appropriate standard. Part VI ex-
plores the inadequacies of the deliberate indifference standard today.
Finally, Part VII proposes that a gross negligence standard would pro-
vide a more appropriate means of evaluating whether prisoner health
22. See Note, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 1499 (cited in note 17). The Code provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
23. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 922, 926 (cited in note 15) (citing "[j]udicial concern lest
an expanding constitutional doctrine dissolve into a common-law tort"); id. at 927 n.29 (postulat-
ing that "some evidence suggests that the judicial fear of a flood of individual malpractice claims
may be exaggerated").
24. For a discussion of litigation-caused defensive medicine, see Edward M. Brecher and
Richard D. Della Penna, Health Care in Correctional Institutions 2 (Nat. Inst. of Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1975).
25. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97.
26. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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care violates the Eighth Amendment.
II. THE PROSCRIPTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The definition of cruel and unusual punishment has changed mark-
edly since this phrase came into use. Recent changes, as well as in-
creased judicial involvement, have improved the calibre of health care
available to prisoners in this country.
A. Interpretations of the Eighth Amendment
The general principle of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment 7 extends back to the Magna Carta.25 The express
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments emerged in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, drafted upon the accession of William and
Mary.29 The exact language of the Eighth Amendment first appeared in
the United States on June 12, 1776, as part of Virginia's Declaration of
Rights.30 Throughout the years, however, the definition of cruel and un-
usual punishment has been varied and imprecise.3 1
The range and severity of punishments at early common law bore
little resemblance to those of more recent eras.3 2 At one time, sanctions
such as dunking, hanging, drawing, quartering, live disemboweling, be-
heading, dissecting, branding, slitting, dismembering, and mutilating all
were permitted for certain offenses. 33
Today, however, the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment bans more than just barbarous physical punish-
27. The Constitution states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. Const., Amend. VIII.
28. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). For an interesting discussion of the history of the
language of the Eighth Amendment, see Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969).
29. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
30. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319 (1972) (Marshall concurring). For a general
discussion of the history of cruel and unusual punishment, see David Rudovsky, The Rights of
Prisoners 29-40 (Richard W. Baron, 1973).
31. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (stating that "[d]ifficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that
cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368
(1910) (stating that "[w]hat constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly de-
cided"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 258 (Brennan concurring) (stating that "[tihe Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, like the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not susceptible of precise
definition"). For a discussion of early Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Malcolm E. Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 Stan.
L. Rev. 838 (1972).
32. See Ira P. Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Standards of
Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 551, 553-54 (1978).
33. Id.; Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 9 (cited in note 18).
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ments 4 Courts have stated a wide variety of tests for determining what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and often examine tests cu-
mulatively.3 5 Some courts have banned barbarous acts.3 1 Others have
proscribed punishments that shock the general conscience or are intol-
erable to notions of fundamental fairness.3 7 Similarly, courts sometimes
have invalidated punishments that are shocking or disgusting to indi-
viduals of reasonable sensitivity. 8 Some courts have banned punish-
ments that satisfy the vague standard of doing something more than
simply offending fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism. 39
Still others have merely declared that a punishment may not be exces-
sive or unnecessary, 0 or that it may not be arbitrary or at odds with the
principles of contemporary society.4' Indeed, courts have held that the
emphasis is on basic dignity,42 and that tests to determine cruel and
unusual punishment are not static.43 Judicial analysis of the Eighth
Amendment is flexible and dynamic4 4 and must draw its meaning from
public attitudes 45 and the evolving standards of decency that reflect the
growth of a maturing society.46
Courts examining prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims of inade-
quate medical care before Gamble used a number of these definitions of
34. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 102; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan concurring) (stating that "[t]he test. . . will ordina-
rily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it
is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punish-
ment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that
the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.")
36. See, for example, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas concurring).
37. See, for example, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3rd Cir. 1970).
38. See, for example, Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
39. See, for example, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
40. See, for example, Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan concurring).
41. See, for example, Furman, 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan concurring); Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
42. See, for example, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
43. See, for example, Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (stating that "[t]he clause of the Constitution
. . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 329 (Marshall
concurring) (stating that "a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation's history is not
necessarily permissible today"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (stating that the "Eighth Amendment has
not been regarded as a static concept"); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (stating that "[n]o static 'test' can
exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual").
44. See, for example, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
45. See, for example, id. at 173; Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (Brennan concurring).
46. See, for example, Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (stating that "[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society");
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175; Hudson v. McMillian, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372, *13 (Feb. 25, 1992).
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cruel and unusual punishment.47 Courts held, for example, that prison
medical care may not shock the conscience, 48 be obviously neglectful, 49
constitute deliberate indifference, 50 amount to continuing denial of
needed medical treatment,51 or constitute a willful refusal to treat a
known ailment.2
B. The Role of the Court
Since the erosion of the so-called "hands-off" doctrine,53 under
which courts deferred virtually without exception to internal actions
and decisions of prison administrators, court involvement has improved
the provision of health care in prisons.54 Because they are insulated
from the political process and committed to enforcing the Constitution,
courts are in a strong position to identify and rectify unconstitutional
prison conditions.5 Furthermore, recognizing the potential inadequa-
cies of prisoners' pro se complaints, courts generally hold such com-
plaints to less stringent standards than they do formal, lawyer-drafted
pleadings. 6
Before the 1960s, courts generally employed the hands-off doctrine,
deferring to decisions made by prison administrators. 7 In the subse-
quent decades, however, courts have eroded this doctrine and no longer
view prisoners as slaves of the state. 8 Still, courts are reluctant to in-
47. For an examination of pre-Gamble Eighth Amendment medical care, see Note, Eighth
Amendment Rights of Prisoners: Adequate Medical Care and Protection from the Violence of
Fellow Inmates, 49 Notre Dame Law. 454 (1973).
48. See, for example, Blakey v. Sheriff of Albemarle County, 370 F. Supp. 814, 816 (W.D. Va.
1974).
49. See, for example, Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1970).
50. See, for example, Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1974).
51. See, for example, Ramsey, 310 F. Supp. at 604.
52. See, for example, Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1).
54. For a discussion of the erosion of the "hands-off" doctrine, see Comment, Am. U. L. Rev.
at 99-104 (cited in note 18).
55. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 359 (Brennan concurring) (stating that "[i]nsulated as they are from
political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the
strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied, even at significant finan-
cial cost").
56. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir.
1972).
57. See, for example, Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1954) (stating that "[ihe
federal courts have held that they do not have the power to control or regulate the ordinary inter-
nal management and discipline of prisons operated by the states," and that "[ihis same principle
has also been followed where the prisoner was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary"); Coppinger
v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (stating that "[t]he internal affairs of prisons,
including the discipline, treatment, and care of prisoners are ordinarily the responsibility of the
prison administrators and not subject to judicial review"); Note, 11 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 805
(cited in note 18).
58. Only in recent decades have prisoners effectively attained the legal status of citizens.
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terfere with the internal affairs of a prison, and deference to the policies
and practices of prison administrators survives to some degree.5 The
difficulty and complexity of the ordinary problems of operating a cor-
rectional facility make courts openly wary of encumbering the adminis-
tration of prison affairs.60 Since the erosion of the hands-off doctrine,
however, courts have shown much less deference to prison administra-
tors in matters unrelated to prison discipline or security.61 Courts today
do not hesitate to intervene to protect prisoners' fundamental constitu-
tional rights.2
Similarly, courts in the past were slow to intervene in the area of
medical care, often holding that medical issues were beyond judicial re-
view. 6 3 Courts afforded prison physicians wide discretion in their judg-
ments and choice of treatments,64 reasoning that the factual specificity
of prison health care decisions rendered them inappropriate for re-
view. 5 Such deference to the determinations of prison physicians exem-
plified the hands-off doctrine.66
In recent years, court involvement in the realm of prison medical
matters has increased, because while courts clearly cannot make an oc-
cupation of second-guessing prison physicians, it is equally clear that
the judiciary can no longer ignore severe medical misconduct.67 The re-
sulting decreased deference to prison health care providers has allevi-
Note, 11 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 805 (cited in note 18).
59. See, for example, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing "a natural
reluctance to interfere with a prison's internal discipline").
60. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (stating that "the problems that arise in the day-to-day opera-
tion of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain insti-
tutional security"); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1328 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that "courts
must be wary to avoid obtrusively monitoring the conduct of prison officials").
61. See, for example, Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1977).
62. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970).
63. See Note, 11 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 877 (cited in note 18).
64. See, for example, Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961, 962 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that
"courts will not inquire into the adequacy of medical care provided to inmates by state prisons
unless there appears an abuse of the broad discretion which prison officials possess"); Thomas v.
Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 419 U.S. 813
(1974), Cannon v. Thomas, 419 U.S. 813 (1974) (stating that "[c]ourts will not attempt to second-
guess licensed physicians as to the propriety of a particular course of medical treatment for a given
prisoner-patient"); Robinson v. Jordan, 494 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that "in the area
of medical treatment prison officials have a 'broad discretion' "); Isele, Constitutional Issues,
MANUAL at 17 (cited in note 18).
65. Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 22 (cited in note 18).
66. See Comment, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. at 122-23 (cited in note 18).
67. See Martinez, 443 F.2d at 924 (stating that "[o]bviously, courts cannot go around second-
guessing doctors. But neither can they ignore gross misconduct by a doctor, especially when it
violates specific orders by the specialists in charge of the case").
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ated some of the criticism of judicial inactivity68 and has immersed the
courts further in the struggle for constitutional standards for prison
health care provision. 9
III. THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD
The Court established deliberate indifference as the standard for
Eighth Amendment claims of unconstitutional prison health care in
1976, and reaffirmed this standard in 1991. In examining the deliberate
indifference standard, it is important to consider the level and type of
care to which prisoners are entitled, the cost of such care, and the socie-
tal concern that prisoners may in some way be receiving rewards for
their crimes.
A. Estelle v. Gamble
The Supreme Court entered the debate regarding constitutional
standards for prison health care in Estelle v. Gamble.70 In this
landmark case, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bans treat-
ment that shows deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical
needs.7 1 The Court made clear that the standard includes dual require-
ments: the treatment given must show deliberate indifference, and such
treatment must be in response to medical needs that are serious. 72 The
Court provided several examples of deliberate indifference, including
inadequate responses to prisoners' needs, intentional delays in treat-
ment or in access to treatment, and intentional interference with pre-
scribed treatment. 73
The majority opined that the Eighth Amendment does not protect
prisoners against mistreatment that is accidental or unintentional in
nature.74 In Gamble, the Court for the first time acknowledged that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment can apply to deprivations
that occur in prison, but that are not explicitly meted out as part of a
sentence.75 Gamble made clear that medical malpractice and negligence
68. See, for example, Comment, 27 Am. U. L. Rev. at 122 (cited in note 18).
69. Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 922 (cited in note 15).
70. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
71. Id. at 104. For an argument that the Gamble standard can extend to the treatment needs
of the civilly committed, see Thomas D. Roberts, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A
New Eighth Amendment Basis, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 731 (1978).
72. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104.
73. Id. at 104-05; MANUAL at 5 (cited in note 10).
74. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105 (stating that "[a]n accident, although it may produce added
anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain,"
and citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), which held constitutional a second attempt of
the execution of a prisoner after the first attempt failed due to an unforeseeable accident).
75. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 1992 U.S.
1992]
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are not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. 6 In its holding,
the Court expressed clearly its intention that the standard not be so
expansive as to create a constitutional tort. In Gamble the Court
stressed that medical decisions such as treatment choices are beyond
the scope of Eighth Amendment claims,78 and emphasized that most
claims do not rise to the constitutional level.79
B. Wilson v. Seiter
In 1991, the Supreme Court revisited the deliberate indifference
standard in Wilson v. Seiter8 0 In that case, the Court extended Gam-
ble's deliberate indifference standard for prison health care to claims of
cruel and unusual punishment regarding all conditions of confine-
ment.8' The Court opined that the same constitutional standard should
apply to all prison conditions, reasoning that medical care is no more a
condition of confinement than are, for example, prison food, tempera-
ture, and clothing.8 2 The Court expressly acknowledged the two-tiered
requirement of Gamble: first, the seriousness of the deprivation or con-
dition; and second, the subjective state of mind of the prison official
allegedly responsible for such deprivation or condition. 3 In Wilson the
Court stressed that the intent requirement derives from the Eighth
Amendment itself, and that, if the alleged injury at issue was not spe-
cifically meted out formally as punishment, then either intent or wan-
tonness is necessary to violate the Eighth Amendment." Thus, the
LEXIS 1372, *17 (Feb. 25, 1992).
76. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06. The Court stated:
[i]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or to be "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind." Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the
Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege
acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. It is only such indifference that can offend "evolving standards of decency" in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
77. Id.; Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 926 (cited in note 15).
78. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107.
79. Id. at 105.
80. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
81. Id. at 2326-27.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2324.
84. Id. at 2325-26 (stating that "[t]he source of the intent requirement is not the predilec-
tions of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punish-
ment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can




Court made clear that intent is needed for a finding of cruel and un-
usual punishment in a case in which the object of the complaint was not
an expressly stated and prescribed aspect of punishment.
C. To What Care Are Prisoners Entitled?
The deliberate indifference standard raises questions regarding the
types and levels of care to which prisoners are entitled. 5 Determining
what health care is reasonable or adequate is fundamental to the reso-
lution of Eighth Amendment prisoner health care cases. 6 Courts and
professional organizations have suggested a number of definitions, but
the most significant common aspect of such proposals is their ambigu-
ity. 7 Proposed standards advocating the provision of "acceptable" or
"adequate" health care are challenging to interpret and apply.8 As a
result, attempts at specifying the required care often approach the issue
negatively, focusing on what constitutes unreasonable or inadequate
medical care rather then on what care is required. 9 In response to the
general ambiguity of proposals, a small number of very specific and de-
tailed proposals for prison health care standards exist 0 The promulga-
tion of uniform health care standards or guidelines would have a
tremendous beneficial effect on both the provision and litigation of
prison health care.
Courts have held that prisoners have a right to reasonable health
care9 1 or to care that is reasonably designed to meet their routine and
emergency medical needs.92 Such a right appears to encompass all as-
85. See, for example, Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
86. See, for example, MANUAL at 4 (cited in note 10).
87. See Anno, Standards for Health Care, MANUAL at 33 (cited in note 11).
88. Id.
89. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 11 (cited in note 18).
90. See, for example, Nancy Neveloff Dubler, ed., Standards for Health Services in Correc-
tional Institutions (Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, 2d. ed. 1986) (setting forth very comprehensive and
extensive standards for health care delivery from vision care to syphilis); Am. Med. Ass'n, Stan-
dards for Health Services in Jails (Program to Improve Medical Care and Health Services in
Correctional Institutions, 1981); Anno, Standards for Health Care, MANUAL (cited in note 11);
Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 8-11 (cited in note 24) (proposing a medical
evaluation system consisting of: preliminary screening for admission; medical history; physical ex-
amination; and additional prediagnostic studies). For information about other proposed standards,
see Anno, Standards for Health Care, MANUAL at 27-37; Office of Development, Testing, and
Dissemination, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, and United States Department of Justice, Health Care in Correctional
Institutions - Participant's Handbook 30 (University Research Corp., 1977) ("Handbook").
91. See, for example, Blakey v. Sheriff of Albemarle County, 370 F. Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. Va.
1974).
92. See, for example, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980); Battle v. Ander-
son, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
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pects of health care, from preventive services and diagnosis, 93 to treat-
ment and rehabilitation." Around-the-clock access to medical services
is also of vital importance.9 5 The violence that prisoners often inflict on
each other or on themselves amplifies the need for emergency care,96
and such emergency treatment must be available at all times.97
Commentators emphasize the need for provision of a range of ser-
vices.98 Sick call, for example, is a crucial aspect of prison health care.99
In addition, prisoners are entitled to dental care,100 which is a vital
component of inmate medical care, ' especially since the dental
problems of inmates generally are more extensive than those of the av-
efage citizen.0 2 Furthermore, prisoners* are' entitled to psychological
and psychiatric services,' 3 and deliberate indifference to the mental
health needs of prisoners is actionable under the Eighth Amendment. 10 4
Courts and professional organizations agree that health care within
prisons is generally inferior to that in outside society, and that the dis-
parity between levels of care inside and outside prisons must narrow.'0 5
Some authorities urge that the level and quality of health care available
to prisoners must be the same as is available to society at large.10 6 Other
authorities, however, reason that the circumstances of incarceration jus-
tify that prison medical services not mirror or equal those available to
93. See, for example, Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 312 (D.N.H. 1977). The court
stated:
An inmate's dependency upon the prison's medical system includes, of necessity, the diagnos-
tic stage of medical treatment. The failure to discover and/or diagnose serious medical
problems can lead to the same evils as does the lack of therapeutic attention once an illness or
injury is known. If one is to be considered as a shocking failure on the part of the government
to fulfill its duty to provide adequate medical care, so must the initial failure of the system to
provide for discovery of latent and incubating diseases and medical problems.
94. See Handbook at 122-23 (cited in note 90).
95. Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 312-13; Neisser 63 Va. L. Rev. at 963 (cited in note 15).
96. Chris Coste, Prison Health Care: Part of the Punishment?, 25(4) New Physician 29, 32
(April, 1976) (stating that "[elmergency care is one of the prisoners' chief concerns. Stabbings and
beatings are common ... as are suicide attempts.")
97. Dubler, Standards for Health Services at 15 (cited in note 90).
98. See, for example, id. at 25.
99. Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 11 (cited in note 24).
100. Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 313; MANUAL at 147 (cited in note 10).
101. See Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 73.
102. See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 576.
103. Id. at 574. See also G. Thomas Peters, Mental Health Care in Jails, in MANUAL at
139; Forer, 31 Emory L. J. at 61 (cited in note 2).
104. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834-35 (11th Cir. 1990); Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 313.
105. See MANUAL at 39 (stating that "It]he courts as well as the professional organizations
drafting standards for delivering health care in prisons.and jails are essentially demanding that
correctional administrators close the gap between the level of care available on the outside and
that available to the incarcerated population").
106. See, for example, Schmidt v. Wingo, 499 F.2d 70, 75-76 (6th Cir. 1974) (Phillips concur-
ring); MANUAL at 40.
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the outside community.10 7
Commentators agree that inmates have a right to be treated by
qualified health personnel.108 Proper training, licensing, and experience
are vital in this regard.10 9 Also, some commentators insist that inmates
have a right to adequate facilities and equipment.110 Similarly, some
courts and commentators assert that prison health care providers must
make sufficient medication available, 1 ' must maintain accurate medical
records, 1 2 and must ensure privacy in the provision of treatment.113
Amid the ambiguity regarding what prison health care must in-
clude, courts and commentators have made clear that inmates have no
right to perfect or optimal health care, '14 or to treatment from preemi-
nent medical providers.1 5 Nor do prisoners have a right to absolutely
every potentially beneficial medical procedure, regardless of how rare or
107. See, for example, Gobert and Cohen, Rights of Prisoners at 341 (cited in note 18) (stat-
ing that "[pirisons cannot be expected to duplicate the range of medical services available outside
of prison. In particular, prisoners might be denied their physician of choice, second opinions, ac-
cess to specialists, and the right to select from alternative treatment modalities as long as the
medical care actually provided meets constitutional requirements"); John W. Palmer, Constitu-
tional Rights of Prisoners at 159 (Anderson, 2d ed. 1977) (stating that "[w]hat is required is that
he be afforded such medical care, in the form of diagnosis and treatment, as is reasonably available
under the circumstances of his confinement and medical condition. Just as prison officials can not
deny all medical aid, inmates can not expect a flawless medical services system").
108. See Dubler, Standards for Health Services at 2 (cited in note 90); Neisser, 63 Va. L.
Rev. at 958 (cited in note 15); Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 17-26 (cited
in note 24).
109. Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 957, 963 (cited in note 15).
110. See, for example, Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 314 (stating that "sufficient physical space
and equipment for emergency and routine medical treatment, a ward for inmates with contagious
diseases not mandating hospitalization or for other inmates who simply need to be monitored,
adequate medications to satisfy the in-house needs of the inmates, and, finally, a dietary service
for inmates requiring special foods are all required if the health and welfare of the prison commu-
nity are to be protected"); Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 958.
111. See, for example, Newman, 503 F.2d at 1331.
112. See, for example, id. at 1323 n.4; Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 313 (stating that
"[iinadequate records in an institution, which relies upon transfers to outside medical facilities for
extended or extensive medical care, are a hazard to the health of the patient inmates"); Brecher
and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 13-15; Dubler, Standards for Health Services at 99
(cited in note 90).
113. See, for example, Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 11.
114. Brown v. Beck, 481 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (stating that "[it is not required
that the medical care provided to a prisoner be perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good");
Hudbon v. McMillian, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372, *14 (Feb. 25, 1992) (stating that "society does not
expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care"); Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June
18, 1989) (cited in note 1) (stating that "[h]aving the right to care does not guarantee Mayo Clinic-
style treatment"); Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 13, 15 (cited in note 18).
115. Schmidt, 499 F.2d at 76 (Phillips concurring) (stating: "Nor is it intended to imply that
a prisoner injured with a heart wound, for example, would be entitled to the services of the fore-
most heart surgeon in the nation. A rule of reason, applied on a case by case basis, must determine
the adequacy of medical care provided").
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experimental.116 Whether inmates have a right to certain elective or cos-
metic medical procedures remains subject to debate.11 It is clear, how-
ever, that prisoners themselves may not determine what treatments are
necessary,118 and that differences of opinion between inmates and phy-
sicians do not by themselves give rise to constitutional claims.119
D. Cost
Issues of cost are vitally important in considering prison health
care.120 Frequently, prison budgets do not provide sufficient funds for
compliance with constitutional standards.' 2 ' Despite this crippling
funding problem, however, many courts refuse to consider cost as a fac-
tor in determining the adequacy of prison health care.'22 Indeed, courts
have consistently stated that a lack of funds cannot justify unconstitu-
tional medical care for inmates.
12 3
Obtaining funds for prison health care is a monumental chal-
lenge,'24 and the low priority that budget planners assign to correctional
facilities worsens the problem. 2 5 Legislative pressures to reduce spend-
ing126 and voter reluctance to pay for prisons compound the cost diffi-
116. See Hampe v. Hogan, 388 F. Supp. 13, 14-15 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
117. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 11 (cited in note 18).
118. Hampe, 388 F. Supp. at 14 (stating that "the prisoner cannot be the judge of what
treatment need be rendered to him").
119. Coppinger, 398 F.2d at 394 (stating that "[t]he prisoner's right is to medical care-not
to the type or scope of medical care which he personally desires. A difference of opinion between a
physician and a patient does not give rise to a constitutional right or sustain a claim under Section
1983.")
120. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 936 (cited in note 15).
121. Rhodes v. Chapman, U.S. 337, 357 (1981) (Brennan concurring).
122. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 18 (cited in note 18).
123. See, for example, Jackson, 404 F.2d at 580 (stating that "[hiumane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considera-
tions"); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that
"[flack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions of incarceration" and
that "we again cannot agree that lack of funds or facilities justify lack of competent medical
care"); Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
"[1]ack of funds for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and
treatment for inmates"); Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 18 (cited in note 18) (explain-
ing that this "principle, that limited budget will not justify insufficient care, has been clearly ac-
knowledged by numerous Courts").
124. See Candice Carponter, Potential Federal Resources, in MANUAL at 99-117 (cited in
note 10) (outlining the problem and examining various possible sources for prison health care
funding).
125. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 936-37; Norval Morris, Minimum Standards for Medical
Services in Prisons and Jails, in Ciba Foundation Symposium 16, Medical Care of Prisoners and
Detainees 37, 40 (Associated Scientific Publishers, 1973) (stating that "[t]he prison stands as a
relatively low claimant for the community's resources").
126. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan concurring); MANUAL at
97 (cited in note 10).
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culty. 127 Furthermore, within prison budgets themselves, medical
services, like other nonsecurity functions, often are low priorities. 12 8
The amount spent on health care in society as a whole provides an
indication of the resources that funding acceptable prison health care
will require;12 9 adequate inmate medical care will necessitate expendi-
ture of much additional money.13 The unavailability of Medicaid to
prisoners further compounds the financial dilemma.1 31 Nevertheless, in-
creases in the funds dedicated to prison health care in recent years
132
provide hope that the problem of cost will not prove insurmountable.
E. Rewarding Crime?
Substantial segments of the American population receive either in-
adequate medical treatment or no treatment at all.13  There is a com-
mon perception that society's criminals should not be treated more
favorably than this country's worst-off noncriminals, and that criminals
are somehow receiving rewards when they receive free medical care.'
Many citizens feel that we coddle, rather than punish, convicts.13 5
Clearly, inequities between medical care provided to prisoners and the
care available to some citizens do exist.136 The solution to this dilemma,
however, is not to lower inmate health care to the level available to
society's least fortunate. Instead, improving the situation of society's
worst-off members must be a vital goal, and it is counterproductive to
use these individuals' plight as a ceiling for quality of treatment of
prisoners.
127. Gail DeGeorge, Wackenhut is Out to Prove That Crime Does Pay, Bus. Week 95 (Dec.
17, 1990).
128. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 937.
129. See MANUAL at 97 (cited in note 10).
130. See Ann Bancroft, No Relief in Sight For Overcrowded California Prisons, San Fran.
Chronicle A13 (April 22, 1991) (stating that the average cost per year per prisoner in California is
$23,000); Charles M. Harris, Jr., Prison Overcrowding-The Time for Policy Change Has Come!,
18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 489, 493 (1991) (estimating that it costs $15,000 per year to guard and
support an inmate); Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 19 (cited in note 18); Brecher and
Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 61 (cited in note 24).
131. Medicaid benefits are not available to prisoners. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 936
(cited in note 15). 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(21)(A) (1988) excludes from coverage "payments with re-
spect to care or services for any individual who is an inmate of a public institution (except as a
patient in a medical institution)."
132. See Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1) (stating that "[t]he states
spent $80 million on prison health care in 1975 and $215 million in 1980, according to a survey
conducted by the Associated Press").
133. See Morris, Minimum Standards at 37 (cited in note 125).
134. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 21. The same argument applies to prison-
ers' receipt of housing and food-commodities which society's worst-off noncriminals also lack.
135. See MANUAL at 1 (cited in note 10).
136. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 21.
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Courts have struggled in applying the Gamble standard of deliber-
ate indifference to serious medical needs.3 7 Under this standard, courts
have found violations of the Eighth Amendment in acts or omissions
constituting denial of treatment, failure to provide prescribed treat-
ment, failure to allow treatment, delay in providing or allowing treat-
ment, and provision of inadequate treatment.' Common to all Eighth
Amendment claims, however, is the requirement of a causal connection
between the acts or omissions of the physician or official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. 139
Courts have held without exception that knowledge of the need for
care, and intentional refusal or failure to provide such care, constitutes
deliberate indifference. 40 Some courts, however, have applied the stan-
dard strictly and have found deliberate indifference only in cases where
an official deliberately and clearly intended to cause harm.' 41 Similarly,
other courts require intent or culpability in the criminal law sense.142
Whether courts require actual intent or somewhat less culpability, it
remains clear that the Gamble standard is not the most liberal
alternative. 143
More typically, courts stray from the traditional intent require-
ment of deliberate indifference and hold that an express intent to inflict
unnecessary pain is not crucial to a finding of deliberate indifference. 44
Many courts have asserted that specific willfulness or intent are not
137. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990). For a brief overview of
what some courts have done in reaction to Gamble, see Dubler, Standards for Health Services at
v-ix (cited in note 90).
138. See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 720 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated, 931 F.2d 711; Hand-
book at 29 (cited in note 90).
139. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). One way in which a plain-
tiff may establish such a causal connection is by "proving that the official was personally involved
in the acts that resulted in the constitutional deprivation." Id.
140. See, for example, Robinson v. Moreland, 655 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1981); Ancata, 769
F.2d at 704; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989).
141. See, for example, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 547-48 n.3 (1981) (Powell concurring,
overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
142. See, for example, Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating
that "the infliction of suffering on prisoners can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if
that infliction is either deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law sense. Gross negligence is not
enough. Unlike criminal recklessness it does not import danger so great that knowledge of the
danger can be inferred;" and that "[p]unishment implies at a minimum actual knowledge of im-
pending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be
inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it").
143. See Stuart B. Klein, Prisoners' Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A Modern
Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 7 Fordham Ur-
ban L. J. 1, 14 (1978).
144. See, for example, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
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requirements, 4 5 and that conscious or reckless disregard, callous inat-
tention, or gross negligence may be equally violative of prisoners'
Eighth Amendment rights. 14 6 Risking harm, without necessarily in-
tending it, may be sufficient for a finding of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.117 Likewise, heinous or obvious neglect may be the constitutional
equivalent of intentional misconduct. 14 8 Also, health care that is grossly
incompetent, inappropriate, excessive, or inadequate may support an
Eighth Amendment claim. 14 9 Commentators have suggested that courts
departing from the intent requirement-regardless of the particular la-
bels they have selected-have found cruel and unusual punishment in
cases where officials demonstrate serious disregard for the needs of the
prisoners for whom they must care.15 °
The Eighth Amendment proscribes obduracy and wantonness, not
good faith error and inadvertence.' 5 ' Thus, courts have consistently
held that a finding of deliberate indifference requires more than lack of
due care.' 52 Courts will not acknowledge accidental or inadvertent mis-
diagnosis or mistreatment as an actionable Eighth Amendment claim. 53
Also, courts hold that the Constitution does not protect prisoners
against injuries, medical or otherwise, resulting from negligence.154
Clearly, negligence will not suffice to prove an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation.'55 In considering negligence, however, courts typically refer to
simple negligence, overlooking the possibility of Eighth Amendment lia-
bility for cruel and unusual punishment inflicted through gross negli-
gence.'56 In Eighth Amendment prison medical care cases, gross
negligence would be a more appropriate standard for measuring cruel
145. See, for example, Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1969).
146. See, for example, Wright v. El Paso County Jail, 642 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
147. Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
148. Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1974).
149. See Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).
150. See, for example, Michael Wells and Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and
the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201, 242 (1984).
151. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
152. See, for example, Berry, 900 F.2d at 1495.
153. See, for example, Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (stating that, as the
result of an unforeseeable accident which injured a prisoner in a failed execution attempt, "[t]he
situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suffered the identical
amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in
the cell block"); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (8th Cir. 1980).
154. See, for example, Mayfield v. Craven, 299 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 1969) aft'd, 433
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970); Ramsey, 310 F. Supp. at 605. See also note 17.
155. See, for example, Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319; Church, 416 F.2d
at 451; Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d at 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970); Isele, Constitutional Issues, MAN-
UAL at 15 (cited in note 18).
156. See, for example, Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106.
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and unusual punishment. Gross negligence provides a heightened stan-
dard, while eliminating the inappropriate focus on the subjective intent
of the prison official or physician, and looking instead at the harm that
the prisoner suffers.
Prisoners can attempt to prove deliberate indifference by showing
through expert testimony, by published judgments, or by published
standards for health care, that the treatment they received was grossly
contrary to accepted medical practice. 157 Plaintiffs may also attempt to
prove deliberate indifference on the part of prison doctors or physicians
by showing that they received no medical care whatsoever. 158 Similarly,
prisoners who receive cursory health care in response to obvious medi-
cal needs may rely on these circumstances in proving deliberate indif-
ference.1 59 Courts also have recognized constitutional violations in cases
where prison doctors manifested indifference by selecting easy and less
efficacious treatment methods, 60 or by denying or delaying needed
treatment. 6' In addition, denial of access to physicians may create a
constitutional claim.'62 Thus, officials who prevent inmates from relat-
ing their health concerns to the medical staff may demonstrate deliber-
ate indifference to the inmates' needs.16 Deficiencies in prison medical
staffing also may themselves support claims of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 6 14 Some courts, however, have balanced the availability and
expense of providing treatment against a number of factors, such as the
seriousness of the inmate's illness, the immediacy of the medical need,
the duration of incarceration, the likelihood of harm resulting from
postponed treatment, and the danger posed to other prisoners.16 5
157. See Howell, 922 F.2d at 720; Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 988 (D.R.I.
1977); Comment, Use of Published Minimum Standards to Determine When Inadequate Prison
Medical Care Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 603, 614 (1979).
158. See, for example, Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (stating that "a complete lack of medical care
raised an inference of rampant deficiencies due to callous indifference to the prisoner's need for
medical care").
159. West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that "[a]lthough the plaintiff has
been provided with aspirin, this may not constitute adequate medical care"); Mandel, 888 F.2d at
789 (stating that "medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may
amount to deliberate indifference").
160. See, for example, Williams, 508 F.2d at 544 (finding deliberate indifference where a
doctor threw away a severed ear and stitched up the stump, instead of attempting to save the ear
by sewing it back on); Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058.
161. See, for example, Ancata v. Prison Health Services, 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985);
Howell, 922 F.2d at 720.
162. See, for example, West, 571 F.2d at 162; Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575.
163. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that "[t]he Eighth Amend-
ment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care.
Prison officials show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs if prisoners are unable to
make their medical problems known to the medical staff").
164. Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1985).
165. See, for example, Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[i]n
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Courts also have found deliberate indifference in repeated exam-
ples of individual negligent acts, when such individual acts singularly
would be insufficient to state constitutional claims.166 Systemic deficien-
cies also may provide the basis for a finding of deliberate indiffer-
ence.1"' In such cases, prisoners need not wait until the harm they
suffer is sufficient to shock the conscience.6 " Courts remain consistent,
however, in holding that differences of opinion between inmates and
physicians do not state claims of cruel and unusual punishment.16 9
Courts also have recognized that the Gamble standard is two-
pronged, requiring deliberate indifference by prison officials to the seri-
ous medical needs of inmates. 1 7  The issue of seriousness remains un-
resolved; some courts, for example, have defined serious medical needs
as those which a physician diagnoses as mandating treatment, or which
are so self-evident that anyone would recognize the need for medical
attention.17 ' Clearly, serious needs may be less than life-threatening. 72
assessing the merits of a prisoner's claim for unconstitutional denial of psychiatric care, the district
court should take into account a number of competing considerations in order to decide whether
that denial amounts to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. On the one hand, it
should consider the seriousness of the prisoner's illness, the need for immediate treatment, the
likely duration of his incarceration, the possibility of substantial harm caused by postponed treat-
ment, the prospects of some cure or substantial improvement in his condition, and the extent to
which the prisoner presents a risk of danger to himself or other inmates. On the other hand, the
court should consider the availability and expense of providing psychiatric treatment and the ef-
fect of such unusual care on ordinary jail administration. In balancing the needs of the prisoner
against the burden on the penal system, the district court should be mindful that the essential test
is one of medical necessity and not one simply of desirability.")
166. See, for example, Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that
"[aJ series of incidents closely related in time, within several months as these are, may disclose a
pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners");
Todaro v'. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that "while a single instance of medical
care denied or delayed, viewed in isolation, may appear to be the product of mere negligence,
repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison authorities to the
agony engendered by haphazard and ill-conceived procedures"); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (stating
that "deliberate indifference to inmates' health needs may be shown by proving repeated examples
of negligent acts").
167. See, for example, Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575; Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058.
168. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 312 (D.N.H. 1977) (stating that "[n]or need
prison inmates wait until the harm they suffer from the lack of medical attention is so egregious as
to independently 'shock the conscience.' If the medical system provided inmates by the state
presents 'a grave and immediate health danger to the physical well-being,' the state's failure to
fulfill its affirmative duty violates the Eighth Amendment and prisoners need not await the inevi-
table harm" (citations omitted)).
169. See, for example, Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1970); Corby v. Con-
boy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973);
Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575.
170. See, for example, West, 571 F.2d at 161; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir.
1989).
171. See, for example, Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 311.
172. Washington v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that, to be serious
under the Gamble standard, "the medical need of the prisoner need not be life threatening").
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For instance, courts may deem basic mental health care needs173 or a
broken hand to be serious.
174
V. ASPECTS OF IMPRISONMENT AFFECTING MEDICAL CARE
Prison health care is difficult, both to provide and to evaluate.
Prison overcrowding, staffing problems, extensive availment of prison
health services, competing nonmedical institutional concerns, and issues
of privatization all complicate inmate medical services.
A. Overcrowding
Prison overcrowding does not by itself violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.175 The effects of overcrowding, however, often may justify consti-
tutional claims.176 Indeed, courts have held environments created by
overcrowding unconstitutional, 177 and prison overpopulation is the
cause of many allegations of cruel and unusual punishment.'
Prisoners have a right not only to health care, but also to a reason-
ably safe environment, 179 for in the absence of a sanitary and safe envi-
ronment, even the world's finest medical care will not produce healthy
inmates.1 80 Evidence indicates that prison overcrowding increases the
rate and severity of illness,18l and further aggravates the dangers that
institutional environments pose. 82
Overcrowding is rampant: nationwide, prison populations increased
by ninety percent between 1980 and 1988.183 The federal prison system
currently is operating at an estimated 172 percent of its capacity. 84
173. See, for example, Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (stating that "[flailure to provide basic psy-
chiatric and mental health care states a claim of deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of prisoners").
174. Robinson, 655 F.2d at 890 (stating that "[a] broken hand can be considered by the jury
to be a serious injury").
175.- Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1249.
176. Id.
177. See Recent Development, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), 47 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 155, 161 (1978) (stating that "[sleveral courts have held that overcrowding alone may
render a system unconstitutional by creating an environment in which prisoners are constantly
subjected to threats of violence").
178. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1248 (stating that "[o]vercrowding is often the root cause of many
of the complaints made by prisoners").
179. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 19 (cited in note 18).
180. Id. at 20.
181. See Terence P. Thornberry and Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison Over-
crowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 Hastings L. J. 313, 336 (1983).
182. See generally Gobert and Cohen, Rights of Prisoners at 334 (cited in note 18).
183. Bancroft, San Fran. Chronicle A13 (April 22, 1991) (cited in note 130).
184. Bureau of National Affairs GAO Advises Bureau of Prisons to Seek Legislation Author-
izing Test to Determine Feasibility of Privatization, 29 Government Employee Relations Report,
No. 1407 at 351 (March 25, 1991) ("Relations Report").
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Furthermore, most states are under court orders to eradicate over-
crowding."8 5 California's prisons reflect typical overcrowding, operating
at 180 percent of capacity, and have been severely overcrowded for
more than a decade. 8 6 Prison populations continue to outpace increases
in prison capacities, in partbecause of recent increases in drug arrests,
and more stringent sentencing guidelines. 8"
Reducing overcrowding is a formidable task; it costs an estimated
$50,000 per inmate to construct, and a reported $25,000 per prisoner
per year to operate, a prison.18 8 There is much discussion today about
accelerated prison construction, early release programs,18 9 and alterna-
tives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders and parole violators. 90
Today's crime rates have created a hardened political climate toward
crime and criminals, however, in which there is skepticism as to
whether legislators care a great deal about prison overcrowding.'19
B. Problems with Staffing
Deficiencies in prison medical staffing may lead to Eighth Amend-
ment violations,' 92 and it is uncertain precisely to what extent the qual-
ity of medical care available to prisoners is inferior to that in the
outside community.'93 The right to health care is meaningless if a
prison health care staff is not competent to satisfy inmates' needs. 94
Ideally, correctional health service staffs should include sufficient
numbers and types of qualified and trained medical professionals to
provide services deemed satisfactory according to national standards of
care.'95 Prison medical personnel should meet training, licensing, and
experience standards, and only qualified medical personnel should
make medical decisions. 96
185. Id. See also DeGeorge, Bus. Week at 95 (Dec. 17, 1990) (cited in note 127).
186. Bancroft, San Fran. Chron. A13 (April 22, 1991) (cited in note 130).
187. See DeGeorge, Bus. Week at 95 (Dec. 17, 1990) (cited in note 127).
188. Relations Report (cited in note 183).
189. See, for example, Harris, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 493 (cited in note 130).
190. Bancroft, San Fran. Chron. A13 (April 22, 1991) (cited in note 130).
191. This view was clear in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981) (Marshall dissent-
ing) (stating that "[i]n the current climate [of rising crime rates], it is unrealistic to expect legisla-
tors to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to inmate health"), and it has only
been strengthened in the last ten years.
192. See, for example, Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 312 (D.N.H. 1977) (stating
that "[s]taff shortages render medical services below constitutional muster if the shortage is such
that it endangers the health of the inmate population by either a lack of medical coverage or by
use of unqualified persons to staff the facility"); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424 (E.D.
Okla. 1974).
193. See Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 16 (cited in note 18).
194. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.
195. See Dubler, Standards for Health Services at 103 (cited in note 90).
196. See Gobert and Cohen, Rights of Prisoners at 340 (cited in note 18).
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In reality, however, nonmedical or unlicensed personnel sometimes
provide prison health care services. 197 Unlicensed doctors," 8 medical
students,'99 graduates of foreign medical schools, and doctors with
drinking or drug problems frequently work for correctional medical ser-
vices. °00 Furthermore, licensed and qualified doctors may treat ailments
for which they lack training or expertise.2 1
Prison health care systems are not attractive employment pros-
pects for most doctors.2 02 The social stigma of association with pris-
ons 20 and the difficulty of establishing a professional reputation
through such employment contribute to the lack of appeal of prison
medical positions. 20 4 Another tremendous barrier to adequate staffing of
correctional health services is low salary.20 5 Prison medical personnel
are paid less than other health care workers in the community,206 and
lagging pay scales may attract only physicians who are either unlicensed
or for other reasons unemployable in the outside medical community.
207
The Reagan administration's dismantling of the National Health Ser-
vice Corps, which allowed doctors to pay off their educational loans
through work in prisons, has served further to discourage physicians
from treating inmates. 0
Working conditions for prison doctors are also unattractive. 0 9
Prison health facilities typically are poorly equipped, poorly ventilated,
poorly lit, and run-down.2 10 Furthermore, medical personnel in correc-
tional facilities frequently work in fear that inmates will assault them
197. See Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 65 (cited in note 24); Isele
Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 15.
198. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 937 (cited in note 15).
199. See Isele Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 16.
200. See Coste, 25(4) New Physician at 33 (cited in note 96).
201. See Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1) (describing a gynecologist
who performed prison dental exams, a pathologist who practiced general medicine, and a pediatri-
cian who practiced internal medicine).
202. Isele, Constitutional Issues, MANUAL at 15 (cited in note 18).
203. Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 937 (cited in note 15).
204. See Medical Care of Prisoners and Detainees at 40 (cited in note 125); Brecher and
Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 53 (cited in note 24).
205. Dvorchak, L.A Times 2 (June 19, 1989) (cited in note 1). For example, in Hawaii, prison
doctors earn $35,000 per year. Id.
206. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 926 n.29.
207. See Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 53 (cited in note 24).
208. See Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1) (stating that "[d]octors
and nurses, in great demand in the outside world, must be recruited to work for civil service wages
in steel-barred surroundings," and that the Reagan Administration "dismantled the National
Health Services Corps, which was a federal program that allowed doctors to pay off educational
loans by working in prisons").
209. See Coste, 25(4) New Physician at 33 (cited in note 96).
210. See generally Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 53-54.
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or take them hostage.2 11 Institutional physicians frequently "burn out"
as a result of practicing in prisons. 21 2 In addition, some prison physi-
cians also practice privately in order to supplement their incomes, and,
as a result, sometimes cease complete and thorough performance of
their inmate services.21 3
C. Availment of Prison Health Services
Generally, inmates avail themselves of prison medical services very
frequently.2 4 There are two reasons for the high utilization of institu-
tional health care services: first, prisoners suffer above-average inci-
dence of most illnesses; and second, hypochondria and malingering are
very common among inmates.21 5 Commentators suggest that prisoners
have a greater frequency of genuine health problems than do other citi-
zens, that they have more general concern for their bodily well-being,
and that they also avail themselves of prison health services because
they are bored, they are lonely, they seek excuses from assigned work,
or they simply seek numbing medication.21 1 In addition, prison admin-
istrators use medical personnel to perform nonmedical functions, such
as various bodily searches and tests. 217 In an environment of such heavy
and diverse use of medical resources, it is a challenge for prison medical
personnel to recognize and meet genuine medical needs.21s
D. Competing Nonmedical Institutional Concerns
The institutional goal of internal security is central to all prison
concerns.21 9 Indeed, most aspects of prison life, including decisions
about housing, work, diet, recreation, movement, and communication
revolve around the overriding concern for security.220 The correctional
personnel who control these various aspects of institutional life concern
themselves primarily with security, and only secondarily with prisoners'
211. See Coste, 25(4) New Physician at 33.
212. See generally Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 8. Brecher and
Della Penna suggest that opportunities for continued education and advancement may help pre-
vent burn-out. Id. at 54.
213. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 937.
214. For an interesting study of prisoner health care utilization patterns, see Lucretia A.
Bolin, Utilization of Health Care Services by a Prison Population (Vanderbilt University School
of Nursing, 1985) (Thesis toward Degree of Master of Science in Nursing, focusing on a maximum
security prison in Middle Tennessee).
215. See Morris, Minimum Standards at 39 (cited in note 125).
216. See, for example, Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 8 (cited in note
24); Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 942-46.
217. See generally Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 945-46.
218. See Morris, Minimum Standards at 39.
219. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974).
220. See Neisser, 63 Va. L. Rev. at 940-42.
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medical well-being. 2 1 Courts have recognized the legitimacy of peno-
logical and security interests, and, to some degree, have deferred to
prison administrators' decisions.222 While these prison goals and policies
are valid and essential, there must be some mutual accommodation be-
tween security considerations and the constitutional right to medical
care.223 Accordingly, courts have held that inmates' rights to medical
care may not be obliterated by institutional security concerns.2  Fortu-
nately, security and medical needs do not routinely clash,221 5 and com-
mentators suggest that a sophisticated health care program may in fact
enhance prison security.
226
E. Privatization of Prison Health Care
Some commentators see the privatization of entire prisons as a via-
ble and desirable means of relieving the tremendous pressures on the
public prison system.2 Courts, however, long have viewed prison oper-
ation and management as an essential aspect of the administration of
the law, and therefore as an exclusively governmental duty.228 In addi-
tion, there is little evidence that the privatization of entire prisons
221. See id. at 938.
222. See, for example, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (stating that "[t]he fact of
confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution limits these re-
tained constitutional rights"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (stating that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests").
223. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
224. See MANUAL at 39 (cited in note 10) (stating that "correctional administrators cannot
lose sight of the fact that the courts have consistently said that health care must take precedence
over security and the right of inmates to health care cannot be subjugated to security
requirements").
225. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986); Hudson v. McMillian, 1992 U.S. LEXIS
1372, *9 (Feb. 25, 1992) (stating that "the State's responsibility to provide inmates with medical
care ordinarily does not conflict with competing administrative concerns").
226. See, for example, MANUAL at 40 (cited in note 10).
227. See, for example, Note, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 1476 (cited in note 17) (stating that "[tlhe
utilization of private prisons today appears to offer a means of relieving pressures on a public
prison system strained to the breaking point"); The National Underwriter Company, U.S. Risk
Ins. Agency Develops New Program, Property & Casualty/Employee Benefits Ed. 32 (March 5,
1990) (stating that "[tihe privatization of detention facilities is a trend that is expected to continue
into the 1990s").
228. See, for example, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that
"[a] state has no higher duty than the preservation of its governmental integrity by the enforce-
ment of its own laws, which inescapably includes the maintenance of an effective state prison
system"); Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106 A. 274, 281 (1919) (stating that "it is
the duty of the state, in the exercise of its police power, to provide for the custody and mainte-
nance of convicts as an essential part of the administration of criminal laws enacted for the protec-
tion of the public"). See also Jonathan Marshall, Privatization-Old Idea Whose Time Has Come,
San Fran. Chronicle A6 (June 3, 1991); Note, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 1479 (cited in note 17).
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saves the public money. 229
The provision of health care itself, however, is not exclusively a
governmental function, 230 and governments in more than half of Ameri-
can prison systems appropriately contract for some types of services
with private health care providers. 231 It seems disturbing, however, that
under the deliberate indifference standard, individuals who are liable to
unincarcerated patients for negligent treatment can enter an institu-
tional arena and create liability for cruel and unusual punishment only
for harm that they inflict intentionally. Some higher standard of care is
necessary.
The two key considerations regarding the privatization of prison
health care are quality of care and cost.232 Academic studies and public
reviews indicate that privately contracted medical services both im-
prove quality and reduce cost.233 Commentators also contend that
privatized prison health care may help reduce the friction caused by
inmates' distrust of health care providers who are also prison officials.234
Inmates often fear that they receive health care services that aim not to
help them, but rather to keep them tranquil.235 Medical care suffers as
conflict and hostility displace trust.236 Commentators also suggest that
separating health care from the rest of prison affairs may help to secure
funds.23 7
A state does not relinquish its constitutional duty to provide medi-
cal care to inmates by contracting out for private health care services
and remains liable for cruel and unusual punishment resulting from pri-
vate contractors' deliberate indifference in providing medical care.3 s An
229. Robert Kuttner, False Profits: The Perils of Privatization, New Republic 21, 23 (Feb. 6,
1989) (stating that "[pirisons also turn out to be disappointing candidates for privatization. Even
aside from the issue of whether something as inherently public as prisons produce durable savings
to the public purse.")
230. See note 13 and accompanying text.
231. Dvorchak, L.A. Times 2 (June 18, 1989) (cited in note 1); Relations Report (cited in
note 184) (identifying Corrections Corporation of America and Wackenhut Corrections Corpora-
tion as leaders in the field of private health care provision in prisons). For examples of contracts
between prisons and private medical providers, see Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institu-
tions at 91-95 (cited in note 24).
232. See Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 66.
233. Marshall, San Fran. Chronicle A6 (cited in note 228).
234. See, for example, Brecher and Della Penna, Correctional Institutions at 8; Neisser, 63
Va. L. Rev. at 941 n.85 (cited in note 15).
235. See G.O.W. Mueller, Medical Services in Prison: Lessons From Two Surveys, in Medi-
cal Care of Prisoners and Detainees at 17 (cited in note 125).
236. See Morris, Minimum Standards at 40 (cited in note 125).
237. See Coste, 25(4) New Physician at 33 (cited in note 96).
238. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (stating that "the dispositive issue concerns the
relationship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner. Contracting out prison medical care
does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those
in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth
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actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 requires the violation of
a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law.2 " In
West v. Atkins the Supreme Court held that a private doctor under
contract to provide medical care to prisoners acts under color of state
law. 240
VI. INADEQUACIES OF THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD TODAY
This Note proposes that the deliberate indifference standard is to-
day an inappropriate measure of the constitutionality of prison health
care provision. The traditional intent requirement, the amorphousness
of the deliberate indifference standard, and evolving standards of de-
cency all mandate that courts apply a more appropriate standard in
determining whether the medical care that inmates receive violates the
Eighth Amendment. The first two of these reasons were as valid at the
time of Gamble as they are today; the third has become more relevant
with medical advances over the years, and will continue to become in-
creasingly compelling as medical technology and resulting societal ex-
pectations of health care quality continue to move forward and improve
in the years to come.
A. The Traditional Intent Requirement
The deliberate indifference standard for cruel and unusual punish-
ment in prisoner health care has traditionally required a finding of in-
tent to harm on the part of the individual who allegedly deprives
inmates of their constitutional rights. 41 It is inappropriate, however, to
hinge a finding of cruel and unusual punishment upon the intent of a
prison official or physician.2 42 In evaluating an Eighth Amendment
claim, what should be relevant is the nature of the treatment rather
than the subjective state of mind of the individual responsible for such
treatment. Courts focus improperly on the motivation of defendants,
and instead should examine the harm that inmates actually suffer.
Amendment rights.") See also Ancata v Prison Health Services, 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985);
Note, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 1481 (cited in note 17).
239. West, 487 U.S. at 48. See note 22 and accompanying text.
240. West, 487 U.S. at 54 (stating that "[r]espondent, as a physician employed by North
Carolina to provide medical services to state prison inmates, acted under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating petitioner's injury. Such conduct is
fairly attributable to the State"). See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982); Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (lth Cir.
1986).
241. See notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
242. The dissent in Gamble stated that "whether the constitutional standard has been vio-
lated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual
who inflicted it." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1967) (Stevens dissenting).
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Prisoners must attempt to satisfy a prohibitively high burden of
proof. As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for inmate plain-
tiffs to prove the intent of prison officials or medical personnel.2 43 In
addition, the all-encompassing nature of the prison environment com-
plicates attempts to determine intent, because it is often difficult to
pinpoint exactly whose intent is relevant. This difficulty is aggravated
by the deference that courts afford to prison health care providers, and,
in the absence of contrary evidence, courts generally must accept these
individuals' own statements regarding their subjective motivation. An
appropriate standard for evaluating cruel and unusual punishment in
prison health care claims must, therefore, eliminate the intent
requirement.
B. The Standard is Amorphous and Difficult to Apply
As evidenced by the range of court interpretations, the deliberate
indifference standard is very difficult to apply. The difficulty begins
with the contradictory nature of the terms "deliberate" and "indiffer-
ence," the former suggesting conduct that is considered, planned, or
premeditated, and the latter suggesting the absence of concern or
attention.244
The deliberate indifference standard has replaced amorphous and
unworkable standards of cruel and unusual punishment245 with a simi-
larly deficient standard. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts em-
ploying the deliberate indifference standard have produced results as
inconsistent as those that emerged from courts applying the supplanted
standards. While a bright-line standard would not be satisfactory in
evaluating constitutional claims of inadequate prison health care, courts
must adopt a standard that is less amorphous than deliberate
indifference.
C. Evolving Standards of Decency
Courts have for many years emphasized that the Eighth Amend-
ment is not static, but rather is evolving and progressive. The standards
of a progressing and maturing society are therefore the key indicators of
243. The "intent requirement . . . likely will prove impossible to apply in many cases ...
[Ijntent simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (1991) (White concurring).
244. "The distinction between deliberate indifference and negligence is conceptually vague
because 'indifference' generally implies a lack of attention by the actor similar to what the law
often calls negligence. The modifier 'deliberate,' however, requires that the actor recklessly ignore
the medical situation in the face of information that a reasonable person would know requires
action." Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 720 n.7 (11th Cir. 1991).
245. See notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
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whether or not challenged prison health care qualifies as cruel and un-
usual punishment.2 46 Consideration of flexible and developing public at-
titudes toward medical care is essential to a judgment of a
constitutional violation.
Because of improvements in medical care delivery and the resulting
heightened public expectations of adequate health care, the deliberate
indifference standard is not the appropriate measure of Eighth Amend-
ment requirements today. Many improvements and advancements have
occurred in medical care in recent years. The American public expects
higher quality health care today than it did even at the time of Gamble,
and the rising number of lawsuits alleging medical malpractice24 7 is evi-
dence of these heightened expectations of superior health care. Such
public attitudes are precisely what courts must assess in evaluating the
evolving perception of society and standards of decency. Prisoners have
a right, therefore, to health care that is better than that which is simply
not deliberately indifferent to their serious needs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court announced that medical
treatment is like other conditions of imprisonment, and extended the
deliberate indifference standard from health care claims to claims of
cruel and unusual punishment involving all prison conditions. In so do-
ing, the Court affirmed and extended the inappropriate standard of de-
liberate indifference.24 This standard was inappropriate when first
announced in Gamble because it improperly focused on the subjective
intent of the prison official or physician, rather than on the nature of
the treatment, and presented prisoners with a prohibitively high burden
of proof. The standard was also inappropriate because it was amor-
phous and exceptionally difficult to apply. These shortcomings survive
today. The standard is today even less appropriate because societal ex-
pectations of medical care, which are a key consideration in the evalua-
tion of Eighth Amendment claims, are heightened as a result of
continuing advancements in medical technologies.
A higher standard of care is necessary to allow inmates relief for
injuries they may suffer from cruel and unusual punishment in prison
medical care provision.2"9 This Note does not suggest, however, that a
simple negligence standard is proper; certainly, factors such as over-
246. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
247. See Comment, 27 Am. U. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 18).
248. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
249. See note 26 and accompanying text.
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crowding,25° problems with staffing,251 facilities,252 and equipment, 53
heavy use of prison health care services,2 54 competing nonmedical insti-
tutional priorities,2 5 and public unwillingness to "reward" prisoners
2 56
mandate that a simple negligence standard not apply.
What should replace the deliberate indifference standard for prison
health care, however, is a heightened standard of gross negligence. This
standard would eliminate the misplaced intent requirement, which
many courts already skirt.2 57 In addition, a standard of gross negligence
would avoid the creation of a constitutional tort,2 58 while providing re-
lief for prisoners who suffer effects of medical treatment that constitute
proscribed cruel and unusual punishment. And, while a gross negligence
standard would not completely cure the old standard's problem of
amorphousness, it would both eliminate much of the definitional ambi-
guity of the deliberate indifference standard, and eradicate the inappro-
priate subjective intent requirement. In addition, the proposed
standard also would be easier to apply in conjunction with published
sets of standards for constitutional inmate health care provision. Thus,
the gross negligence standard would better serve the purposes of the
Eighth Amendment and would provide a viable cause of action for cruel
and unusual punishment in prison health care.
Michael Cameron Friedman
250. See part V.A.
251. See part V.B.
252. See note 209 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. See part V.C.
255. See part V.D.
256. See part III.E.
257. See notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
258. See note 77 and accompanying text.

